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INTRODUCTION
Shortly after taking office, President Barack Obama announced
that his Administration would pursue a policy of vigorous antitrust
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enforcement in order to ensure healthy competition in the economy.'
In two of the highest-profile antitrust cases that have followed, the
United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") sought to block two
proposed mergers in which the target companies were low-cost
competitors in their industries. The DOJ won a judgment in
November 2011 that blocked retail-tax giant H&R Block from
acquiring 2nd Story Software, maker of the low-cost digital taxpreparation program TaxACT. 2 A month later, the DOJ scored
another "victory" when AT&T dropped its bid to acquire the low-cost
telecommunications provider T-Mobile USA. 3
These enforcement actions provide a relatively rare glimpse4
into the government's interpretation of section 7 of the Clayton Act,5
which is designed to stop potentially problematic mergers before the
reduction in competition causes consumers harm. 6 Since the acquiring
firm in each of these proposed mergers was the second largest in its
industry, the mergers could have been seen as facilitating competition
by making the second-place firms more efficient or innovative and
thus more capable of competing against the first-place firms. But the

1.
Stephen Labaton, Obama Takes Tougher Antitrust Line, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12fbusiness/economy/12antitrust.html.
2.
See United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 45 (D.D.C. 2011) (judgment
for the United States enjoining the merger).
3.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Issues Statements
Regarding AT&T Inc.'s Abandonment of Its Proposed Acquisition of T-Mobile USA Inc. (Dec. 19,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2011/278406.pdf (calling
AT&T's dropped bid after the DOJ filed suit to enjoin the AT&T/T-Mobile merger "a victory").
4.
The H&R Block/TaxACT victory was the DOJ's first merger enforcement action since
2004 that had gone to trial. Brent Kendall, TaxAct Deal Spurs Rare Court Action, WAIL ST. J.,
Sept. 3, 2011,
httpJ/online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190471660457654628275378
4982.html. The vast majority of enforcement activity goes unreported because the enforcement
agencies either help the parties to restructure their deals before a complaint is even filed or offer
consent decrees at the same time as complaints, indicating that the Agency will not legitimately
contest the proposed merger. See, e.g., 33 FlC & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE HART-SCOTr-RoDINo
ANN. REP. 1-2, available at http-//www.ftc.gov/os/2011/02/1101hsrreport.pdf (summarizing all of
the enforcement actions from fiscal year 2010, which included only nineteen actions by the DOJ
and twenty-two by the FTC); see also id at 5 fig.2 (showing that "second requests" occurred in
only two to four percent of all mergers that were notified to the enforcement agencies between
fiscal years 2001 and 2010).
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
5.
6.
See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 332 (1962) ("[T]he very wording of §
7 requires a prognosis of the probable future effect of the merger." (emphasis omitted)); U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1 (rev. ed. 2010) [hereinafter 2010
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf ("[T]hese
Guidelines reflect the congressional intent that merger enforcement should interdict competitive
problems in their incipiency and that certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom possible
and not required for a merger to be illegal.').

2013]1

IDENTIFYING A MAVERICK

325

DOJ did not see the mergers that way. Instead, the DOJ moved to
protect the low-cost competitors from acquisition on the theory that
their independence was an essential ingredient for competition in the
industry.
These markedly similar enforcement actions might suggest
that the government has a new focus in antitrust enforcement; at very
least, they provide a ripe opportunity to identify and evaluate the
specific theory of anticompetitive harm that the government argued in
those cases and might argue in the future. This Note refers to that
specific theory as "the maverick-firm theory of anticompetitive harm."
Both federal agencies in charge of antitrust enforcement-the DOJ
and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")-use the "maverick" label
to refer to firms that play a special competitive role in their industries
and thus require protection under antitrust law.7 In United States v.
H&R Block, for instance, the court observed that the government had
committed quite heavily to this maverick-firm theory of
anticompetitive harm: "The parties have spilled substantial ink
debating TaxACT's maverick status."8 It is axiomatic, then, that the
persuasiveness of this theory depends on how the government defines
a maverick firm and whether that definition can accurately identify
specific firms whose independence is truly essential for healthy
competition. Otherwise, as the court noted, this label "amounts to
little more than a game of semantic gotcha."9
The first goal of this Note is to show that neither the
government nor any other legal authority has offered a persuasive
definition of a maverick firm. A natural first place to look for a
definition is in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the joirit
publication of the DOJ and the FTC that "describe[s] the principal
analytical techniques and the main types of evidence on which the
Agencies usually rely to predict whether a horizontal merger may
substantially lessen competition." 0 Indeed, the 2010 Guidelines do
define a maverick firm as "a firm that plays a disruptive role in the
market to the benefit of customers."" Demonstrating that a firm

7.
2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 2.1.5.
8.
833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 79 (D.D.C. 2011).
Id.
9.
10. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 1.
11. Id. § 2.1.5; see also discussion infra Section I.B (arguing that while the text of the 2010
Guidelines provides a definition of a maverick, that definition is not effective in identifying the
class of target firms that should remain independent).
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meets this definition is supposed to be "informative" evidence that the
merger will have adverse competitive effects. 12
The DOJ did in fact follow this prescription and identified both
TaxACT and T-Mobile as mavericks in their respective industries by
pointing to evidence that they "disrupt[ed]" the market for retail tax
preparation and mobile telecommunications, respectively.13 However,
as the court noted in H&R Block, this definition only helps a plaintiff
or court identify a special subset of firms in need of protection if
"disruptive" behavior is distinguishable from the type of competitive
behavior in which every firm must engage to survive. The court
observed: "The government has not set out a clear standard, based on
functional or economic considerations, to distinguish a maverick from
any other aggressive competitor. At times, the government ... seems
to suggest that almost any competitive activity on TaxACT's part is a
'disruptive' indicator of a maverick."14 Commentators characterized
the opinion as "chastis[ing] the parties" for relying too heavily on the
maverick label, and suggested that it threw the theory's viability into
question.15
The second goal of this Note, which is inspired by this critique,
is to restore the viability of the maverick-firm theory of
anticompetitive harm by offering a more specific definition of a
maverick firm based on the business-management concept of
disruptive innovation.Although legal authorities have been seemingly
unable to articulate a set of criteria that distinguishes disruptive
behavior from ordinary competitive behavior, business-management
scholars have had more success. In the field of business management,
disruptive behavior is defined as competing by offering a product or
service that is significantly worse than the market leader's in some
ways, but better meets the needs of unserved customers in other

2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 2.
13. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction passim, United States v. H&R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011)
(No. 11-00948), available at http/www.justice.gov/atr/Cases/f273600/273683.pdf; Amended
Complaint 1 3, 32-33, 36, United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 11-01560 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f275100/275128.pdf; see also H&R Block, 833 F.
Supp. 2d at 79 ("At times, the government has emphasized TaxACTs low pricing as evidence of
its maverick status, while, at other times, the government seems to suggest that almost any
competitive activity on TaxACT's part is a 'disruptive' indicator of a maverick.').
14. H&R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 79.
15. Government Prevails in Antitrust Challenge to Software Merger, COOLEY LLP (Dec. 5,
2011), http://www.cooley.com/government-prevails-in-antitrust-challenge-to-software-merger.
12.
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ways.16 One common disruptive strategy is trading off higher
performance in favor of lower price. This strategy is distinct from
traditional competition in that disruptive innovators do not try to beat
the most successful firms at their own game. It turns out that the
subset of firms that employ this type of strategy not only "play a
disruptive role in the market to the benefit of consumers,"17 but also
tend to require independence from firms that employ traditional
strategies. Therefore, it is the recommendation of this Note that the
government adopt a set of criteria for identifying disruptive innovators
as its definition of a maverick firm. This more specific proposed
definition of a maverick is not intended to drastically change the
government's approach to reviewing mergers. In fact, this Note will
demonstrate that the DOJ's recent enforcement actions would likely
have reached the same result under the new definition. The proposed
definition is merely meant to articulate and clarify the discomfort that
could have been motivating the government's recent actions to block
the acquisition of low-cost competitors; this will help make the
maverick-firm theory of anticompetitive harm more persuasive going
forward.
This Note will proceed in three parts. Part I will describe the
legal rationale for blocking a proposed merger and demonstrate that
neither the 2010 Guidelines nor the government's recent filings offer a
definition of a maverick that comports with this rationale. It will also
point out a similar gap in legal scholarship on the subject. Part II will
then fill in this gap by drawing on a different field of study: businessmanagement theory. It will define the concept of disruptive innovation
and discuss how the characteristics of a disruptive innovator are
consistent with those that antitrust law seeks to protect. Part III
suggests that this new definition should be adopted and announced by
the DOJ and FTC, and analyzes the recent H&R Block/TaxACT and
AT&T/T-Mobile deals through this lens. A brief conclusion will follow.

16. For a general description of the theory of disruptive innovation, see the introduction to
CLAYTON Ivi CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA (Collins Business Essentials 2006)
(1997). The definition will be discussed in more detail in Section II.A.
17. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 2.1.5.
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I. EXISTING DEFINITIONS OF A MAVERICK FiRM

A. The Goals of Antitrust and the Rise of the Maverick-Firm Theory of
Harm
Federal law empowers the antitrust agencies to block a merger
if it poses either of two threats to competition: (1) if it could result in
one dominant firm unilaterally setting prices, or (2) if the firms
remaining postmerger would be likely to coordinate with each other to
raise prices.' 8 The maverick-firm theory of anticompetitive harm falls
into the second category; it is an argument that the proposed merger
makes coordination more likely.' 9 However, it is only since the 2010
revision to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines that the agencies have
considered eliminating a maverick to be direct evidence of an
anticompetitive merger. 20 Prior versions discussed the maverick status
of a target firm as one piece of evidence in a totality-of-thecircumstances approach to predicting whether a postmerger group of
firms would be able to overcome the difficulties inherent in
coordination. 21 This totality-of-the-circumstances
approach is
consistent with the view-which rose to prominence during the
Chicago school revolution in the 1970s-that the law should not credit
formalistic evidence, but look to a case-by-case analysis of the
economic effects of a proposed merger. 22 This Part summarizes the

18. These two concerns are known as "unilateral effects" and "coordinated effects,"
respectively. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6, §§ 6-7.
19. The revised version of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, released in 1997, discussed
maverick firms in the section on mergers that might result in coordinated interaction:
"[A]cquisition of a maverick firm is one way in which a merger may make coordinated interaction
more likely, more successful, or more complete." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.12 (rev. ed. 1997), available at httpJ/www.justice.gov/atr/
public/guidelinesthmg.pdf.
20. Cf. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 2 (referring to the "Disruptive Role of a Merging
Party" as one of the categories of evidence "that the Agencies, in their experience, have found
most informative in predicting the likely competitive effects of mergers'); AAI Says DOJ
Complaint in H&R Block/TaxACT Merger Provides Transparency on Maverick Firms, AM.
ANTITRUST
INST.,
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/aai-says-doj-complaint-hrblocktaxact-merger-provides-transparency-maverick-firms (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) ("The
2010 revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines stress the usefulness of direct evidence, such as
eliminating a maverick, in showing that a merger will potentially harm competition.").
21. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 19, § 2.12 (discussing the maverick status
of a merging party as one of several factors that could prove a merger would have "coordinated
effects').
22. See Richard A Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 931-32 (1979) (discussing the fact that the Chicago school has prevailed on the point that
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development of this legal test for predicting whether a postmerger
group of firms will be able to coordinate to raise prices. It also
demonstrates that the existing definitions of a maverick firm-in the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, government case filings, and legal
scholarship-do not meaningfully assist in that analysis and,
therefore, should not provide a shortcut around the totality-of-thecircumstances approach.
The early history of merger enforcement was dominated by the
concern that industries with a lot of merger activity could be trending
toward a dangerous level of concentration. 23 Theorists feared that
when the number of firms in an industry was small, coordination
would be inevitable. 24 As a result, courts blocked mergers well in
advance of those industries reaching such levels. 25 The seminal
Supreme Court case, United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,
put it this way:
[The] intense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration warrants
dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior,
or probable anticompetitive effects. Specifically, we think that a merger which produces
a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market is so inherently likely to
lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects. 26

economic analysis rather than "unsystematic" observation is the superior way of proving that a
firm's behavior is anticompetitive).
23. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving
Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 142-43 &
nn.27-30 (2002) (surveying the prevailing pre-1970 merger analysis and concluding that courts
and antitrust practitioners acted with a strong presumption against concentrated markets).
24. See id. at 138 ("The dominant and largely unquestioned view among economists and
antitrust commentators was that when only a few firms competed in an industry, they readily
would find a way to reduce rivalry, collude tacitly, and raise prices above the competitive level.");
Posner, supra note 22, at 944 (referring to the two schools of antitrust thought and describing
the pre-Chicagoan industrial organizationists-also known as the Harvard school-as
"continu[ing] to believe that persistently high concentration in an industry warrants breaking up
the leading firms"); Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Canduct-PerformanceParadigm and
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1106 (1979) (discussing the threat from coordinated effects).
25. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962) (holding that
Congress intended merger enforcement to halt a trend toward concentration before the structure
became problematic); see also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272-73, 281
(1966) (prohibiting a merger between firms with market share of 4.7 percent and 4.2 percent
because the large number of independent Los Angeles grocery stores had been shrinking over the
past decade); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 547, 552-53 (1966) (prohibiting
a merger between the tenth-largest brewer in the nation and the eighteenth-largest on the trendtoward-concentration grounds).
26. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
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This abundance of caution is inconsistent with the modern notion that
a merger should only be blocked if its direct effect would be a
substantial reduction in competition due to a heightened ability to
coordinate.
The Chicago school revolution of the 1970s, with its emphasis
on proving economic harm, had the effect of significantly reducing
antitrust law's emphasis on structure. 27 Instead, practitioners of the
era focused on the factors that suggested whether firms in a particular
concentrated industry would be able to overcome the difficulties
inherent to coordinating prices or outputs, and whether other firms
would enter the industry to compete down price if the incumbent firms
did overcome the difficulties. 28 The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
reflected this new emphasis. 29 They stated that the government would
"focus first" on the structure of the hypothetical postmerger market,
but then take into consideration a variety of other factors that "will
create, enhance or facilitate the exercise of market power."30 One
influential case described this new paradigm as a "totality-of-thecircumstances approach." 31
This paradigm still prevails today, with the most recent version
of the Guidelines-the 2010 edition-making clear that a merger
creating a highly concentrated market can still survive scrutiny if
there is evidence that demonstrates ease of entry, merger-specific
efficiencies, likely failure of one of the firms in the absence of the

See generally Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Should ConcentrationBe Dropped
BAR ASS'N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PERSPECTIVES ON
FUNDAMENTAL ANTITRUST THEORY 339 (2001); Jonathan B. Baker, The Problem with Baker
Hughes and Syufy: On the Role of Entry in Merger Analysis, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 354-56
(1997) (describing the Chicago school's influence on the courts).
28. See Baker, supra note 23, at 146-47 (stating that as a result of the Chicago school
revolution, "[h]igh prices were no longer seen as the inevitable result of high market
concentration; the success of tacit collusion instead was understood to depend upon whether the
firms were able to overcome the difficulties of identifying a consensus on price and market shares
and deterring cheating on that consensus"); Posner, supra note 22, at 945 ("The Chicago school
does not deny that concentration is a factor that facilitates collusion of a sort difficult to detect,
although it attaches less significance to concentration per se than do the oligopoly theorists. It
asks, rather, how it is that excessive profitability can persist without attracting new entry that
will cause prices to fall to the competitive level.").
27.

from the Merger Guidelines?, in AM.

29.

See Thomas E. Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion,

Efficiency, and Failure,71 CALIF. L REV. 497, 505-25 (1983) (summarizing the rise and focus of
the 1982 Guidelines).
30. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES § III (1982), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11248.pdf.
31. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

2013]

IDENTIFYING A MAVERICK

331

merger, or some structural barrier to coordination. 32 These
extenuating factors are meant to more accurately predict whether the
concentrated industry will actually result in anticompetitive harm in
the form of higher price, reduced output, or diminished innovation. 33
However, the 2010 Guidelines also recommend several ways to
demonstrate "adverse competitive effects" with evidence that
supposedly obviates the need for a full inquiry into the structure of the
market and the possible extenuating factors. 34 Showing that the target
firm is a maverick is one of those recommended ways. 35 This label is
supposed to attach when several competitors would prefer to collude to
raise prices or reduce innovation but one or more firms play a special
role in making that impossible. For instance, if one firm has a unique
incentive to cut prices it will "often resist[ otherwise prevailing
industry norms to cooperate on price setting."3 6 That resistance will
require all the other firms to keep their prices low or else suffer losing
their customers to the unique firm.3 7 If the firm playing this role is
always the same one, it is supposed to be evidence that the remaining
parties would coordinate in the absence of that maverick firm. 38
However, labeling a firm a maverick under the Guidelines'
prescription does not address whether the acquiring firm would play a
similar role once it obtained the unique firm's assets.
The key to employing this maverick-firm theory of
anticompetitive harm is to be able to identify what the effect of a
firm's elimination would be. 39 Only those firms that need to remain

32. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6, §§ 9-11 (outlining "Entry," "Efficiencies," and
"Failure and Exiting Assets" as three mitigating factors in an otherwise problematic merger); id.
§ 7.2 (discussing the structural factors that make an industry vulnerable to coordinated conduct).
33. See id. § 1 (stressing the "fact-specific" nature of the agencies' inquiry into a proposed
merger and stating the basic legal principle that "(a] merger enhances market power if it is likely
to encourage one or more firms to raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise
harm customers"); see also Baker, supra note 23, at 154-56 (discussing the development of
antitrust theory from the conclusions of predictive economic modeling).
34. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 2.
35. Id. § 2.1.5 (section entitled "Disruptive Role of a Merging Party").
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in Horizontal
Merger Enforcement, ANTITRUST, Summer 2008, at 29, 34 (discussing the use of the maverickfirm theory of harm and stating that the agency would need to "identify the likely maverick, and
explain how the merger would change the maverick's incentives so as to make coordination more
likely or more effective").
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independent to prevent coordination should be labeled "mavericks."40
Being able to identify a true maverick and its incentives is key to
understanding the incentives of each of the firms in a postmerger
world.41 This picture of the postmerger world will establish whether,
in the words of section 7 of the Clayton Act, "the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition."42 As a result,
to employ this theory, the plaintiff should use a definition that
comports with economic principles driving antitrust analysis. 43 As the
next several Sections will show, neither the 2010 Guidelines
themselves nor the government's arguments in case filings nor legal
scholarship have offered a definition that identifies a subset of firms
that must remain independent to retain the incentive to flout
coordination.
B. Definitions in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Since the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines recommend
special protection for maverick firms, it seems obvious that they
should enable practitioners to identify firms that require
independence. But, in fact, they do not. A "maverick" is defined as "a
firm that plays a disruptive role in the market to the benefit of
customers," but the Guidelines never go on to explain what a
disruptive role entails.44 There are merely four examples of general
behaviors that "may" indicate a maverick firm. 45 A firm might be a
maverick if (1) it "threatens to disrupt market conditions with a new
technology or business model," (2) it has an "incentive to take the lead
in price cutting," (3) it has "the ability and incentive to expand
production rapidly using available capacity," or (4) it "has often

40. See Baker, supra note 23, at 136 (defining a maverick as "the firm that keeps the [other
competitors] price increases lower than they otherwise would have been").
41. See id. at 140-41 (stating that identifying the maverick is the "key" to explaining which
changes in market structure are troublesome and why).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
43. Cf. United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 79-80 (D.D.C. 2011)
(suggesting that the maverick-firm theory is unpersuasive since the United States had supplied
no definition); David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form
Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and
Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 1004 (2006) (arguing that the desire of a
maverick firm to cut prices directly affects collusion); David Gilo, The Anticompetitive Effect of
Passive Investment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2000) (discussing how investment in rivals,
especially by an aggressive competitor, can harm competition).
44. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 2.1.5.
45. Id.

2013]

IDENTIFYING A MAVERICK

333

resisted otherwise prevailing industry norms to cooperate on price
setting or other terms of competition."46 These examples are not
specific enough to allow a practitioner to identify a subset of firms that
require protection. Firms that meet these criteria do not necessarily
need to remain independent in order to encourage competition in the
industry.
Although the first example of behavior encourages
practitioners to protect firms with a new technology or business
model, the Guidelines do not indicate which types of technologies or
business models necessitate protection. The only clue is that they
must "threaten[] to disrupt market conditions," but without more
detail about what constitutes disruption, this guidance is merely
conclusory. 47 Furthermore, since the technology or business model
would be acquired along with the target firm, it is unclear why the
merged firm would not have the same ability to disrupt the market
with the technology or business model as the supposed maverick.48
Similar problems accompany the other examples of behaviors
in which a maverick "may" engage. There are many reasons why a
firm might "take the lead in price cutting" or resist "prevailing
industry norms to cooperate," but most of them are not unique to a
firm in need of protection. Every firm has an incentive to compete
vigorously by dropping price or otherwise undercutting the prevailing
norm of cooperation if doing so will expand market share enough to
make up for the loss in profit margin. 49 The Guidelines do point out
that a firm with excess capacity could be a special case since the firm
might have a lower cost of expanding share and a greater ability to
undercut prices, but that characteristic is both transferrable and
exhaustible.50 It is transferrable because the excess capacity would
still exist postmerger, so there is no reason to think that the merged
firm would not play the same role that the acquired firm did
premerger. It is exhaustible because the excess capacity would
eventually become dedicated to production if the firm kept frustrating
coordination attempts by expanding its market share.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. This Note will build on the disruptive-technology idea to suggest that this example gets
closest to setting out an acceptable criterion for maverick firms. See infra Section II.B.
49. See Baker, supra note 23, at 158 ("Firms are led to compete rather than collude by their
motive to maximize profits. By lowering price, a firm can increase the quantity it sells. If the
additional profit from selling more exceeds the lost profit from cutting price, a firm will find that
lowering price raises its profits." (footnote omitted)).
50. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 2.1.5.
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The H&R Block court specifically called out this troubling
aspect of the maverick-firm theory: "The government has not set out a
clear standard, based on functional or economic considerations, to
distinguish a maverick from any other aggressive competitor."5 '
Although the court noted the criteria supplied by the Guidelines, it
refused to use the criteria as a way of identifying a subset of firms
that warranted protection.52 It found instead that TaxACT "play[ed] a
special role in this market that constrains prices," and it engaged in
more of a full totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to enjoin the
merger. 53 This reasoning suggests that the underlying maverick-firm
theory is viable, but that the government needs to provide a more
helpful definition of a maverick firm that comports with the goals of
antitrust law in order to rely on the classification as a shortcut.
C. Definitions in Recent Merger Cases
The antitrust agencies' filings could be another place to find
criteria suggesting how to distinguish a maverick firm from a mere
vigorous competitor. Since the agencies must allege a plausible theory
of anticompetitive harm in order to sustain an action,54 one might
expect that they would provide a more helpful definition in the filings
than they do in the Guidelines. However, recent filings (those filed
since the 2010 Guidelines were released) do not identify criteria for a
subset of firms that need to remain independent in order to encourage
competition in their industries.
Over the last three years (FY 2009-FY 2011), the DOJ and the
FTC have filed section 7 complaints55 in a combined total of eighty-two
cases.56 Of those eighty-two complaints, five indicated that the

51. United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 79 (D.D.C. 2011).
52. Id. at 79-80.
53. Id. at 80.
54. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (holding that evidence of
mere parallel conduct without a theory of anticompetitive harm was insufficient to survive the
pleading requirement on a motion to dismiss).
55. Or the equivalent, in the case of the FTC.
56. See FTC, MERGER ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS - FY 2011, available at http//www.ftc.gov/
bc/caselist/merger/total/2011.pdf (listing the Agency's 2011 merger enforcement actions); FTC &
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HART-ScoTI-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010 (2011)
[hereinafter HSR 2010 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/02/
1101hsrreport.pdf (providing data on FIC and DOJ enforcement actions in 2010); FTC & U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCorr-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009 (2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/10/101001hsrreport.pdf (providing data on FIC and DOJ enforcement
actions in 2009).
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complaining agency objected at least partially on the grounds that one
of the firms played a "disruptive role" in the industry.5 7 Three of those
cases were settled out of court (AT&T/T-Mobile, Ticketmaster/Live
Nation, Dean Foods/Foremost Farms), 8 one was dropped by the
agency after it lost its motion for preliminary injunction
(LabCorp/Westcliff), 59 and one went to verdict for the government
(H&R Block/TaxACT). 60 These cases demonstrate how the
enforcement agencies employ the maverick-firm theory. Each
reference to the theory demonstrates a significant lack of clarity over
how the maverick firm was identified as such. If there is any unifying
theme, it is that a maverick firm is one that consistently prices below
its competitors, which is-again-the incentive of every firm acting
competitively.
The proposed AT&T/T-Mobile merger involved the market for
mobile wireless telecommunications services. 61 AT&T Inc. was the
second-largest provider of those services and was looking to acquire TMobile USA, Inc., the fourth-largest provider. 62 The only other
nationwide networks were operated by Verizon Wireless and Sprint
Nextel Corp. 63 The DOJ's theory of anticompetitive harm from the
merger focused on characterizing T-Mobile as an "aggressive
competitor."64 The DOJ pointed to T-Mobile's history of innovation and

57. Amended Complaint, United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 11-01560 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f275100/275128.pdf; Complaint, United States v.
H&R Block Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 1:11-CV-00948), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f271500/271579.pdf; Complaint (Public Version), Lab. Corp. of
Am., FTC No. 9345 (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9345/1012011
apcorpcmpt.pdf; Complaint, United States v. Ticketmaster Entm't, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-00139
(D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f254500/254552.pdfComplaint, United States v. Dean Foods Co., No. 10-C-0059 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2010), available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f254400/254455.pdf.
58. See Final Judgment, United States v. Dean Foods Co., No. 10-C-59 (E.D. Wis. July 29,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f273400/273469.pdf (settling the case and
entering final judgment for the parties); HSR 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 10
(describing the consent decrees approved in the Ticketmaster case); Press Release, U.S. Dept of
Justice, supra note 3 (announcing AT&T dropped its bid to purchase T-Mobile).
59. Order Returning Matter to Adjudication and Dismissing Complaint, In re Lab. Corp. of
Am., FTC No. 9345 (Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9345
/1104211abcorporder.pdf; Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, FTC v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No.
SACV 10-1873 AG (MLGx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011), 2011 WL 3100372 (denying the
government's request for preliminary injunction).
60. United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 92 (D.D.C. 2011).
61. Amended Complaint, United States v. AT&T Inc., supra note 57.
62. Id. 11 7-8.
63. Id. 2.
64. Id. 1 27.
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6
the fact that it had positioned itself as a "value option."*
It also relied

on internal documents to show that T-Mobile had expressed that it
would engage in a "challenger" strategy and that it had used
"disruptive pricing" plans. 66 The DOJ drew on this evidence to invoke
the maverick-firm theory of anticompetitive harm: "[T-Mobile's] new
aggressive and innovative pricing plans, low-priced smartphones, and
superior customer service would have been likely to disrupt current
industry models and require competitive responses from the other
national players." 67 However, it did not define "disrupt" or explain why
those innovations and low prices should be considered unique or
nontransferrable to AT&T.
In Ticketmaster/Live Nation, the DOJ sought to block the
proposed merger in the market for "primary ticketing services .. . to

major concert venues in the United States."68 Ticketmaster was
"dominant" in this market because its share allegedly exceeded eighty
percent.69 It was looking to acquire Live Nation, the nation's largest
concert promoter, which had just recently launched a competing
ticketing service for its own venues and planned to expand similar
service to third-party concert venues. 70 The DOJ filed suit to enjoin
the merger on the theory that Live Nation was a unique firm worthy
of protection because it had a different business model that gave it
"economic incentives" to reduce the price of ticketing-service fees. 7'
The complaint invoked the language of the maverick-firm theory when
it described Live Nation's ascent: "Thus, entry into primary ticketing
created an opportunity for Live Nation to increase its overall profit
margin and disrupt Ticketmaster's business model by lowering service
fees." 72 Though the use of the word "disrupt" suggested that Live
Nation's business model was unique, the complaint failed to define
how disruptive competition is different from the normal competition
that a dominant firm like Ticketmaster would always prefer to
eliminate.

65. Id.
66. See id. (citing a T-Mobile presentation that described the firm as "the No. 1 value
challenger of the established big guys in the market'); id. 11 4, 15, 16, 18 (referring to disruptive
pricing).
67. Id. 36.
68. Complaint, United States v. Ticketmaster Entm't, Inc., supra note 57, 1.
69. Id. 2.
70. Id. T 3.
71. Id. T 4.
72. Id. 28.
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In Dean Foods/Foremost Farms, the DOJ sought to reverse an
already-consummated merger between two fluid-milk suppliers.73
Prior to the merger, Dean Foods's Dairy Group was the country's
largest processor and distributor of milk, and Foremost Farms was a
small, local cooperative of independent dairy farmers serving the
Wisconsin area.74 The DOJ pointed to the unique traits of Foremost
Farms in arguing that the merger had resulted in anticompetitive
harm: it described Foremost Farms as "a significant, disruptive, and
aggressive competitor" 75 and pointed specifically to Foremost's history
of "dangerous" and "irrational" price cuts, explaining this behavior by
reference to the independent producers' excess capacities. 76 The DOJ
also indicated that it was relying at least in part on a maverick-firm
theory of anticompetitive harm when it argued that entry would not
suffice to keep the industry competitive.77 The complaint stated that
none of the other milk suppliers in the area could expand supply "to
disrupt coordinated interaction by Dean and its remaining competitors
in the fluid milk market."78 While the complaint alleged examples of
Foremost's behavior that fit the examples of maverick-firm behavior in
the Guidelines, it did not identify which aspects of this behavior could
not be replicated in the postmerger world.
In these three cases, the parties settled the suits by consent
decree, and so it is not possible to observe whether the courts would
have been persuaded by the government's poorly defined maverickfirm theory. However, in the following two cases, the courts did get a
chance to respond.
In LabCorplWestcliff, the FTC sought to reverse a transaction
in which LabCorp acquired all of Westcliff's assets and became one of
only two competitors in the clinical-laboratory-testing market in
Southern California.79 The FTC explicitly identified Westcliff as a
"price-cutting maverick competitor" whose removal from the market
would "allow LabCorp to exercise market power both unilaterally by
increasing prices on its own, or in coordination with its only remaining

73. Complaint, United States v. Dean Foods Co., supra note 57, 1 1.
74. Id. IT 20, 22.
75. Id. 47.
76. Id. 1 3, 24.
77. Id. 52.
78. Id.
79. Memorandum in Support of FTC's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction at 1, FTC v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No. 10-ap-01564 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2010),
ECF No. 31-2.
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significant competitor, Quest."8 0 In an attempt to explain why
Westcliff should be considered a "price-cutting maverick competitor,"
the FTC pointed to the company's background: "As an upstart
competitor seeking to expand its share of physician group business,
Westcliff had the incentive to win business by pricing capitated
contracts aggressively, and did so."si The administrative complaint
went on to detail the various ways in which Westfall priced below the
two other major players, LabCorp and Quest. 82 The FTC's motion for
preliminary injunction provided more detail and evidence to support
the market definition and other elements of the case, but no evidence
to demonstrate why Westfall required independence. 83 The motion for
preliminary injunction was denied; the court was apparently unmoved
by the maverick-firm theory of competitive harm.8" It held that the
FTC incorrectly defined the market, suggesting that the FTC's
shortcut around the structural argument was not compelling evidence
of anticompetitive harm.85
Finally, in H&R Block/TaxACT, the DOJ sought to prevent the
second-largest provider of digital do-it-yourself tax preparation from
acquiring the third-largest provider.86 The DOJ's argument for
protecting TaxACT as a maverick was extensively developed in all the
pre-trial filings.87 Nowhere, however, did the DOJ define what a
maverick is. It simply applied the label on two grounds: (1) the parties'
internal documents referred to TaxACT as a "tax industry

80. Complaint (Public Version) 1 4, In re Lab. Corp. of Am., FTC No. 9345 (Dec. 1, 2010),
availableat http//www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9345/1012011apcorpcmpt.pdf.
81. Id. $ 26.
82. Id.
83. Memorandum in Support of FTC's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction, supra note 79, at 6-42.
84. Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, supra note 59, at *23 (denying the
government's request for preliminary injunction).
85. Id.; see also Clifford H. Aronson et al., CaliforniaDistrict Court Denies Federal Trade
Commission Request for a PreliminaryInjunction in Medical Laboratory Merger Case, SKADDEN,
ARPS, 2 (March 3, 2011), http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/CaliforniaDistrictCourt
DeniesFederalTrade_CommissionRequest.pdf (commenting that shifting the emphasis away
from market definition and toward alternative tools in the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines
was not persuasive to the court).
86. See United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 44 (D.D.C. 2011) ("The
proposed acquisition challenged in this case would combine HRB and TaxACT, the second and
third most popular providers of DDIY products, respectively.").
87. Complaint, United States v. H&R Block, Inc., supra note 57, $$ 28-36; Plaintiffs
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at
5-10, United States v. H&R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 11-00948) [hereinafter
H&R Block PI Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f273600/273683.pdf.
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maverick,"88 and (2) the firm had a "history" of making the most
competitive offerings in the tax-preparation industry89-it started the
trend of offering some products for free. 90 The DOJ's memorandum
treated "maverick" as a synonym for "competing aggressively with low
prices and product innovation," or as a label that follows from the
observation that the company "take[s] market share at the expense of
its competitors."91 But neither of these descriptions explains why
coordination would follow if H&R Block acquired TaxACT; all
companies, including the hypothetical postmerger H&R Block, have
the incentive to compete aggressively and try to capture the market
with lower prices or better products. The DOJ also applied the
"disruptive" label to TaxACT's conduct, but with no more satisfying
explanation. 92 It relied mostly on quoted language from internal
documents to make the case. 93
In arguing for special protected status for TaxACT, the DOJ
invoked conclusory statements that do not suggest why firms that
have been labeled "mavericks" should be treated differently. In fact,
the memorandum in support of preliminary injunction merely
reinforced the impression that there is no difference between any
normal competitor (which would be expected to compete
"aggressively") and a firm playing a disruptive role in the industry.
The DOJ only cited one case for the proposition that acquiring a
maverick will substantially lessen competition: FTC v. Libbey, Inc.,
which merely states that an "important consideration when analyzing
possible anticompetitive effects" is whether the acquisition "would
result in the elimination of a particularly aggressive competitor in a
highly concentrated market."94

88. H&R Block PI Memo, supra note 87, at 2.
89. See id. (quoting internal documents saying that TaxACT "has consistently forced the
tax preparation industry to become more competitive, and in doing so has forced its competitors
to change as well").
90. Id. at 5-7.
91. See id at 1 (supporting its labeling TaxACT as a "maverick'); id. at 6 (calling such a
competitive strategy a "maverick offer'); see also id at 9 ("Over the years, TaxACT has continued
to disrupt the market and gain share through its maverick behavior and strategy of offering
highly functional products at comparatively low prices.').
92. See, e.g., id. at 9-10 ("Ultimately though, HRB would determine that purchasing
TaxACT was a better way to 'eliminate' TaxACT's 'disruptive' maverick conduct." (quoting
exhibits)).
93. Id.
94. FTC v. Libbey, 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 47 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing FIC v. Staples, 970 F.
Supp. 1066, 1083 (D.D.C. 1997)).
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These instances from the last three years of merger
enforcement demonstrate that the enforcement agencies use a
maverick-firm theory of the case when one of the firms has a history of
pricing below its competitors. But as the court pointed out in H&R
Block, this aggressive competition is not a unique characteristic that
suggests a particular anticompetitive outcome postmerger. 95 A firm
may be able to consistently price below competitors because it is a
more efficient producer, or because it has excess capacity. Those
benefits would be acquired by any purchasing firm, so there is not
necessarily a reason to worry about a merger in those instances.
Therefore, the agencies' recent case filings shed no additional light on
a way to identify low-cost firms that require special protection under
antitrust law.
D. Definitions in Legal Scholarship
Several antitrust scholars have written on the maverick-firm
theory of harm in mergers, but none have provided criteria to identify
a firm that truly deserves the maverick label. Most fail to distinguish
between a firm that requires independence to constrain coordination
and a firm that aggressively competes.
David Gilo has written on the collusive effects that result from
different business tactics such as passive investment96 and standardform contracts.97 Integral to his analyses is what effect these business
tactics have on maverick firms. 98 In discussing these effects, Gilo
references the maverick firms of the Guidelines, but only assumes a
definition that facilitates his inquiry. 99 Without any support, he
states: "[T]he firm most eager to cut prices is the only firm whose
incentives matter. If it prefers to cut prices, collusion breaks down,
and if it prefers not to cut prices, collusion is sustainable. Antitrust
agencies call such firms 'maverick firms.' "100 In another paper, Gilo
avoids defining the term by providing a parenthetical description:

95. See United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 79 (D.D.C. 2011) ("Here, the
record is clear that while TaxACT has been an aggressive and innovative competitor in the
market, as defendants admit, TaxACT is not unique in this role.").
96. Gilo, supra note 43, at 5-6.
97. Gilo & Porat, supranote 43, at 1004.
98. See id. (discussing how boilerplate can help a "maverick ... raise its profits by making
collusion sustainable"); Gilo, supra note 43, at 8 (outlining that the paper will "examine . . . the

legal implications of passive investment by a maverick firm").
99. Gilo & Porat, supra note 43, at 1004.
100. Id.
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"[Antitrust agencies] inquire as to whether the merger involves the
acquisition of a maverick (i.e., an inherently more aggressive) firm."'(o
Such descriptions assume the answer that antitrust enforcers should
seek when trying to decide whether a particular firm deserves
protection under the maverick-firm theory of harm. The real questions
are why the firm prefers to cut prices, or compete aggressively, and
whether the postmerger firms would do so in that firm's absence.
In one of his papers, Gilo explains in more detail that a
maverick firm is one that has an incentive to undercut competitors in
the short term, while the other competitors remain at a collusive
price.102 This, he argues, is irrational because the other competitors
will never remain at the collusive price, and "all firms, including the
maverick, usually earn lower profits than they could have earned had
collusion been sustainable." 03 Of course, Gilo is just describing the
classic problem of coordination; this rationale demonstrates that his
view of the maverick does not differ from that of a traditional,
vigorous competitor.
Another scholarly piece, by David T. Scheffman and Mary
Coleman, seeks to quantify the potential competitive effects from
eliminating a maverick.104 But this paper, too, offers a definition that
is impossible to meaningfully distinguish from that of a traditional
competitor:
Under this ["Removal of a Maverick"] theory, there is compelling evidence that a
particular competitor (the maverick) has been a particularlyaggressive competitor-i.e.,
the impact of the maverick's loss is not just from the loss of a competitor but from the
loss of a particularly aggressive competitor. In simple terms, the competitive
significance of the maverick is significantly greater than would be indicated by its
105
market share.

These authors seem to want to imbue some special meaning to the
phrase "particularly aggressive" as it modifies the notion of a
competitor, but as discussed above, traditional competitors are
expected to behave aggressively, consistent with their incentive to win
the most customers at the most profitable price possible. Unless these
authors mean to suggest that there is some sort of personal aggressive
vendetta, or irrationality, behind the behavior of a maverick firm,
their definition does not point out any enduring characteristics that
101. Gilo, supra note 43, at 5.
102. Gilo & Porat, supra note 43, at 1004.
103. Id.
104. David T. Scheffman & Mary Coleman, Quantitative Analyses of Potential Competitive
Effects from a Merger, 12 GEO. MASON L REV. 319, 319-20 (2003).
105. Id. at 321 (emphasis in original).
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suggest the firm is unique in its ability to thwart coordination. It does
not distinguish a firm that must remain independent from a common
competitor. While their discussion is not incorrect-a maverick will be
an aggressive competitor-it fails to assist practitioners in identifying
what characteristics make the maverick firm unique in its ability to
undercut and disrupt coordination.
Jonathan B. Baker gets closer to laying out a set of criteria for
identifying a firm deserving of the maverick label. 06 He recognizes
that, before advocating for protection, plaintiffs and courts will need to
understand why a maverick behaves in a particularly aggressive way
and whether that behavior is unique to the unmerged firm.107 In so
doing, he recognizes that the Guidelines do not themselves define
maverick firms in need of protection, but argues that "three strategies
are available" to a plaintiff who wants to show that one firm plays a
unique role in constraining prices. 08 He calls these strategies
"revealed preference," "natural experiments," and "the a priori factors
approach."109
The "revealed preference" strategy looks to past pricing
behavior to see if a particular firm is consistently offering the lowest
prices or failing to follow other competitors' price increases.110 This is
the same criteria that the scholars and cases cited above have used."'
However, this past behavior, even if it has been consistent, does not
necessarily mean that the firm's incentive to undercut prices and
expand market share is unique among its competitors. Even if it is,
the characteristics causing this unique quality could transfer to the
merged firm after an acquisition. Therefore, this evidence alone does
not suggest that the antitrust laws should protect the identified firm.
The "natural experiment" approach suffers the same problem.
It looks to see if an industry's prices change when the particular firm
in question experiences a change in its marginal costs.112 While this
106. See Baker, supra note 23, at 173-77 (section entitled 'Identifying the Maverick").
107. Id. at 163; see also Baker & Shapiro, supra note 39, at 34 (stating that, under the
authors' way of analyzing coordinated effects, the plaintiff would need to "identify the likely
maverick, and explain how the merger would change the maverick's incentives so as to make
coordination more likely or more effective").
108. Baker, supra note 23, at 173.
109. Id. at 174-75.
110. See id. at 174 (citing Northwest Airlines as an example of a maverick firm identified
with the revealed preference strategy because it "failed to raise prices" and "forced" the rest of
the airlines to rescind price increases).
111. See discussion supra Sections lB-C (discussing the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and
several recent merger cases).
112. Baker, supra note 23, at 174.
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strategy may be able to identify a low-cost firm that is constraining
prices, it says nothing about how long its cost savings would endure or
how an acquiring entity would incorporate the cost savings into its
business strategy postmerger.
Finally, the "a priori factors approach" suggests that a firm's
characteristics can indicate that it is both a constraint on industry
prices and that its acquisition would remove that constraint. 113
However, Baker stops short of naming the particular characteristics
that a practitioner could observe to indicate this special maverick
status. He argues that, all other things being equal, a maverick is
likely to have a relatively small market share and the ability to
"expand sales inexpensively." 114 These characteristics ensure that the
firm will get a greater benefit from a lower price, relative to
incumbents with larger market share.115 While this observation does
explain why the firm is uniquely likely to thwart coordination, it still
falls short of laying out criteria that a practitioner could use to
identify a firm that needs to remain independent to protect
competition. A firm that can expand sales inexpensively may also be
able to pass that advantage on to an acquiring firm, which would still
have the incentive to increase market share further. Therefore, it
cannot be that every low-cost, low-market share firm is deserving of
protection. The maverick label will only be meaningful when the a
priori factors indicate that a firm has an advantage that not only
stokes aggressive competition but also would be destroyed in a
merger. The goal of the next Part is to isolate the characteristics that
all those firms have in common so that a practitioner can use them to
identify firms truly worthy of the maverick label.
II. USING THE THEORY OF DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION TO DEFINE A
MAVERICK

This Note has so far demonstrated that the Guidelines, recent
DOJ and FTC filings, and legal scholarship have only established a
list of traits that a practitioner might see in a maverick firm: it might
consistently offer low prices, its product offering or business model
might be innovative, and it might be able to rapidly expand production
(via excess capacity or otherwise). Although these traits may be
common among maverick firms, none of them necessarily requires
113. Id. at 175-76.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 175.
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independence to encourage competition in the industry. A further subclassification is necessary to identify firms that must remain standalone entities. The business-management literature provides a
potential subset of firms that also exhibit these traits: they are known
as disruptive innovators. 116
A. What Is a Disruptive Innovator?
A disruptive innovator is a term of art coined by Clayton
Christensen of Harvard Business School. 117 Put simply, a disruptive
innovator uses a new technology or business model to introduce a
product or service that performs worse than the products or services
being sold by the incumbents in the industry.118 The fact that the
product is worse is what ultimately leads to its success.119 This concept
is incredibly counterintuitive, which is why it took Christensen an
entire book-The Innovator's Dilemma'20-to credibly support his
theory. He uses several case studies describing the success of startup
companies with products that seemed laughable to the dominant
players in the industry, whose products were superior in every way
that had ever mattered.121 The disruptive innovator is able to stick
around, however, because it is able to serve a very specific part of the
population: those who do not need superior performance.122 The
disruptive innovator's foot in the door is that it does a bad job cheaply,
so its prices are lower for customers who can accept that tradeoff.123
This setup produces successful results time and time again
because the dominant players in the industry are too focused on their
"best" customers, for whom the cheaper, shoddier solution is
116. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 16, at xv.

117. David Whelan, Clayton Christensen: The Survivor, FORBES.COM (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0314/features-clayton-christensen-health-care-cancersurvivor.html (describing that the author originated the moniker "principles of disruptive
innovation").
118. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 16, at xviii.
119. Cf. id ("Ironically, in each of the instances studied in this book, it was a disruptive
technology that precipitated the leading firms' failure.").
120. Id.

121. See id, at xx-xxi (summarizing the contents of the book as containing examples from
the markets for hard disk drives, earthmoving machines, steelmakers, retail shopping, printers,
personal digital assistants, motorcycles, computers, accounting software, and insulin); see also
id. at xxix (presenting a table of established technologies and their disruptive corollaries).
122. See id. at xv (describing disruptive innovations as having "other features that a few
fringe (and generally new) customers value").
123. See id ("Products based on disruptive technologies are typically cheaper, simpler,
smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to use.").

2013]

IDENTIFYING A MAVERICK

345

undesirable.124 Furthermore, the typically small market share that is
available to a disruptive innovator does not serve the growth needs of
a large, successful firm.125 Therefore, the incumbents are lulled into
complacency while the disruptive innovator is able to improve its
product or service without interference.126 Eventually, the disruptive
innovator's cheaper way of doing things catches up to the incumbents'
traditional ways, and it becomes truly substitutable for even the best,
most demanding customers.127 By this point, it is often too late for the
incumbents to react.128
While this Note cannot replicate Christensen's prolific writings
on this theory and its applicability to industries of all types,1 29 a
commonplace example serves to illustrate. Most people are probably
familiar with the role of disruptive innovation in a contemporary
market: movie rentals. Remember when movie rentals came from
Blockbuster or Hollywood Video? With hindsight, it is obvious that
Netflix, Redbox, and iTunes were fierce competitors for the retail
chains-so why did Blockbuster wait until it was too late to begin a
subscription service like Netflix's? The likely reason is that
Blockbuster saw Netflix as an inferior business model-its selection
was not as good, consumers could not get the movies on a last-minute
impulse, and it did not have priority contracts for new releases.130
Blockbuster's best customers were those who wanted all these
features, and so the firm was unable to see Netflix as a true
competitor. But for a specific group of customers, the tradeoff made
sense to avoid late fees. And, as history has shown, Netflix was able to
leverage this advantage for long enough to become a good substitute
for the Blockbuster experience, even for the most demanding
customers, by investing in novel methods of distribution such as live
streaming and by expanding its content.' 3 '
124. See generally id. at xxiii-xxviii (outlining five principles for why successful incumbent
firms fail to catch on to disruptive technologies).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. at xvi (showing that disruptive innovations improve over time).
128. Id. at xv.
129. For a more detailed treatment, see generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, ERIK A. ROTH
& ScoTr D. ANTHONY, SEEING WHAT'S NEXT: USING THEORIES OF INNOVATION TO PREDICT
INDUSTRY CHANGE (2004); CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & MICHAEL E. RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR'S
SOLUTION (2003); CHRISTENSEN, supra note 16.

130. See generally Adam Richardson, Netflix's Bold Disruptive Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV.
BLOG NETWORK (Sept. 17, 2012, 9:35 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2011/09/netflixbold_
disruptive._innovation.html (describing Netflix as an example of a disruptive innovator).
131. Id.
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More than just a way to describe companies, the businessmanagement literature treats the theory of disruptive innovation as a
way to predict the future of industries.132 Christensen's startling
prediction is that disruptive innovators end up toppling the dominant
players in the industry because those dominant players cannot do
what the disruptive innovator doeS.133 This is because incumbent
firms have management systems and cultures that prevent the
success of disruptive strategies.134 For instance, incumbents are
accustomed to driving growth through higher profit margins, which
makes the low profit margins necessary for a disruptive strategy
unattractive, so the incumbents pass up the opportunity to capture
that segment of the market.135 The culture at large incumbent firms
tends to reward big investment opportunities, and the niche demand
for disruptive innovation is not "large enough to be interesting." 1 36
Additionally, market research usually cannot uncover how consumers
hope their products will be worse, so all of an incumbent's data tends
to counsel away from the disruptive strategy.137 These characteristics
make incumbent firms inherently inhospitable to disruptive
strategies. Christensen goes so far as to instruct incumbent firms to
"creat[e] an independent organization" if they want to pursue a
disruptive strategy.138
B. The Characteristicsof a Disruptive InnovatorAre Consistent with
the Guidelines'Descriptionof a Maverick Firm
The business-management theory of disruptive innovation
defines a category of firms that have the same characteristics that the
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines describe as being typical of a
"maverick" firm.139

132. See generally CHRISTENSEN, ROTH & ANTHONY, supra note 129 (treating disruptive
innovation as a way to predict the future of industries).
133. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 16, at xi.

134. See id. at xxii ("If good management practice drives the failure of successful firms faced
with disruptive technological change, then the usual answers to companies' problems . . . all
exacerbate the problem.").
135. See id at xx ("Hence, most companies with a practiced discipline of listening to their
best customers and identifying new products that promise greater profitability and growth are
rarely able to build a case for investing in disruptive technologies until it is too late.").
136. Id.
137. See id. at xxi (section entitled "Markets that Don't Exist Can't be Analyzed").
138. Id. at xxiv.
139. The 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 2.1.5, state:
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First, a disruptive innovator always utilizes "a new technology
or business model." 140 Furthermore, an acquisition would result in
that technology being discarded because the incumbent firm usually
believes that it is not and cannot be good enough for the best
customers (the ones it is focused on serving). This would result in
anticompetitive harm because the least-demanding consumers would
have to pay more for performance that they do not need or want,
raising the price in the short run and preventing the lower-cost firm
from innovating to serve the needs of the more demanding customers
in the long run.
Second, the theory of disruptive innovation is consistent with
the description that the firm "may have the incentive to take the lead
in price cutting or other competitive conduct or to resist increases in
industry prices."141 The disruptive innovator has the incentive to take
the lead in price cutting because that is its value proposition to a niche
market. This approach differs from that of the incumbents, which
usually have the goal of best-in-class design.
Finally, a disruptive innovator will "often resist[] otherwise
prevailing industry norms to cooperate on price setting or other terms
of competition."142 This is because the disruptive innovator will be an
outsider to the group of incumbents that have the most to gain from
tacit coordination. Moreover, the incentive to collude will be low
because the differentiated price point is the feature on which the
disruptive innovator is likely to base its strategy.
The characteristics of a disruptive innovator are also consistent
with observations about mavericks in the agencies' filings and the
field's legal scholarship: Disruptive innovators consistently price
below competitors and produce goods or services more inexpensively,
due to the strategy of trading off performance for price. They even

The Agencies consider whether a merger may lessen competition by eliminating a
"maverick" firm, i.e., a firm that plays a disruptive role in the market to the benefit of
customers. For example, if one of the merging firms has a strong incumbency position
and the other merging firm threatens to disrupt market conditions with a new
technology or business model, their merger can involve the loss of actual or potential
competition. Likewise, one of the merging firms may have the incentive to take the
lead in price-cutting or other competitive conduct or to resist increases in industry
prices. A firm that may discipline prices based on its ability and incentive to expand
production rapidly using available capacity also can be a maverick, as can a firm that
has often resisted otherwise prevailing industry norms to cooperate on price setting or
other terms of competition.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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usually have small market shares, due to the common strategy of
targeting a niche segment of the market first.
C. The Acquisition of a DisruptiveInnovator Will Have Anticompetitive
Effects
The theory of disruptive innovation goes beyond the Guidelines'
description of a maverick by providing criteria that a practitioner can
use to identify which low-cost firms must remain independent to
continue constraining prices in the future. This is because the
acquisition of a disruptive innovator will result in the loss of a unique
value proposition for the consumer. As Clayton Christensen predicts,
disruptive strategies are almost always unsuccessful when attempted
from inside incumbent firms, and so the acquiring firm will be highly
unlikely to offer the disruptive product or service.143 This will result in
higher prices (when the disruptive strategy had been based on trading
off performance for price) and less innovation (as often occurs when a
disruptive innovator has the chance to keep improving its product).
Therefore, the acquisition of a disruptive innovator is likely to result
in the loss of those characteristics that created fierce downward
pressure on price and the incentive to innovate.
These anticompetitive effects are exactly what the Guidelines
seem to anticipate in suggesting that maverick firms should be
protected. As such, the antitrust agencies should amend the
Guidelines and adopt the definition of a disruptive innovator as a set
of criteria for identifying maverick firms that need protection under
the antitrust laws.
III. THE ANTITRUST AGENCIES SHOULD USE THE DISRUPTIVE
INNOVATION TEST TO DEFINE A MAVERICK FIRM

A. The DisruptiveInnovation Test and Its Benefits
When regulators or courts observe a firm with a large market
share and an established brand trying to acquire a low-cost
competitor, they should look to the theory of disruptive innovation to
determine if the low-cost competitor must remain independent to
constrain coordination in the industry. If they identify a disruptive
innovator, they should apply the label of "maverick" and employ the
presumption of anticompetitive harm. Summarizing Section II.B, the
143. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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criteria for a disruptive innovator are: (1) the firm offers a product or
service that is worse in some way than the traditional offerings, (2)
the poor quality is accompanied by a lower price (or some other
innovative benefit), and (3) the product or service only works well for a
niche segment of consumers who substitute away from the traditional
competitors. 144
The benefits of adopting the disruptive innovation test as the
criteria for a maverick firm are threefold. First, as Jonathan B. Baker
suggests, understanding the motivations of a firm and the other
competitors in the industry helps determine when that firm should be
protected. 145 If the disruptive innovation test were adopted as the
criteria for a maverick-firm theory, the definitional inquiry would
simultaneously resolve the predictive inquiry and indicate the firm's
motivations in the hypothetical postmerger world. This would result
in regulators using the term of art more judiciously and narrowly,
since not every firm that competes aggressively and undercuts price
consistently will be a disruptive innovator. The narrow and welldefined criteria would render the maverick label more convincing to
courts, too, which would be able to see that analytical rigor, rather
than mere rhetorical flourish, is behind a maverick-firm theory of the
case.
Second, the clarity of this test would improve the transparency
of antitrust enforcement. With a more robust theory for why
mavericks should be protected, the DOJ and the FTC could clearly
announce that they were applying the maverick-firm theory of
anticompetitive harm. This would stand in marked contrast to the
approach in recent cases, where the government failed to clearly
announce how its observations about the target firms were material to
its legal theories.146 Clear announcement would streamline the order
of proof and make judicial management of often-complex antitrust
litigation more efficient: the parties would only need to litigate
whether the target firm is a disruptive innovator and whether the
resulting presumption of liability could be rebutted. Furthermore,
announcement would deter problematic mergers in the first place. One
of the goals of the Guidelines is to "assist the business community. . .
by increasing the transparency of the analytical process underlying

144. See generally CHRISTENSEN, supra note 16, at xviii-xx (discussing the criteria for a
disruptive innovator).
145. Baker, supra note 23, at 147-48.
146. See discussion supra Section I.C (discussing filings of the last three years).
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the Agencies' enforcement decisions."147 If firms knew ahead of time
that acquiring a disruptive innovator would receive scrutiny, they
could save both their resources and taxpayer dollars from being
wasted on litigation to defend anticompetitive deals. Announcing this
disruptive innovation test in the Guidelines or in a future case could
prevent the anticompetitive deals before they happen.
Finally, the disruptive innovation test would help justify the
evidentiary value of internal business documents that refer to
"disruption." The government has often relied on quotes from board
presentations and other business documents to support the
characterization of a firm as disruptive to industry coordination. 148
Under the current approach-where the issue of disruption is merely
a conclusory legal theory-these quotes seem like irrelevant lay
opinions on an issue of law for the court.149 The disruptive innovation
test, however, would translate those quotes from the business world to
the legal world. Because the theory of disruptive innovation has its
roots in the field of business management, business leaders'
observations about whether firms are disruptive innovators would be
extremely relevant evidence that a firm is actually a maverick worthy
of protection.
Even though all of these benefits counsel toward adoption of
the disruptive innovation test, there is one caution for those applying
the test. After establishing that the target firm is a disruptive
innovator, the presumption of anticompetitive harm should still be
rebuttable. This is particularly important as it applies to the barriersto-entry defense. 50 Disruptive innovators tend to use business models
and technologies that are relatively easy to replicate because their

147. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 1.

148. See discussion supra Section I.C (providing examples of such characterizations from
filings of the last three years).
149. This is perhaps another reason that the H&R Block court seemed so incensed by the
government's use of the maverick label and the associated evidence from internal documents,
when it was otherwise amenable to the argument that TaxACT played a "special role." See
United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 79-80 (D.D.C. 2011) (contrasting
disapproval over the maverick label with agreement that TaxACT "play[s] a special role in this
market that constrains prices').
150. The barriers-to-entry defense is explained in § 9 of the 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 6.
It refers to the fact that even where a merger suggests that the remaining firms will have
unilateral power to raise price or will be able to coordinate, other firms may respond to the
merger by entering and approximating the role that used to be played by the target firm. If such
entry is likely, the law should allow the merger to proceed because the ultimate outcome in the
industry will not be anticompetitive.
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products are, by definition, lower quality. 151 This lower quality may
suggest lower startup costs. In fact, Clayton Christensen points out
that one of the main barriers to disruptive innovation is recognizing
the market demand for a lower-end product. 152 If a disruptive
innovator achieved enough success to warrant an acquisition attempt,
then it probably would have demonstrated the market demand, and
copycats could have a relatively easy job in replicating that success.
Where there are no other structural barriers to entry, this particular
set of circumstances could suggest that the postmerger world would be
competitive despite the elimination of a disruptive innovator.
B. Applying the Disruptive Innovation Test to the H&R Block! TaxACT
and AT&T/T-Mobile Mergers
Both of the DOJ's recent cases demonstrate that the
government can likely apply the disruptive innovation test where it
already has an intuition that a unique low-cost competitor should be
protected under the antitrust laws. Both TaxACT and T-Mobile likely
meet the definition of a disruptive innovator, and therefore satisfy the
criteria of a maverick firm that needs to remain independent to
constrain coordination.
TaxACT is likely a disruptive innovator in the retail taxpreparation industry. As a reminder, the three criteria for a disruptive
innovator are: (1) the firm offers a product or service that is worse in
some way than the traditional offerings; (2) the poor quality is
accompanied by lower prices (or some other innovative benefit); and
(3) the product or service only works well for a niche segment of
consumers who substitute away from the traditional competitors.
TaxACT meets all three criteria because it bucked the traditional,
highly trusted model and offered its product for free online. 153 The
traditional model of one-on-one, in-store assistance is a very high
quality, individualized service. Intuit, the maker of TurboTax, was the
original disruptive innovator in the field-offering a cheap and crude
solution in the form of one-size-fits-all tax-preparation software that

151. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 16, at xv ("Products based on disruptive technologies are
typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to use.').
152. See id. at xxi (section entitled "Markets that Don't Exist Can't be Analyzed").
153. See generally H&R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 45-46 (summarizing the founding of
TaxACT and its free strategy).
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users could purchase and install on their computers.15 4 TaxACT
offered an inferior product to both H&R Block and Intuit, but it did so
for free. Though the TaxACT brand was likely not well known or
trusted, the free online product was probably a good-enough solution
for that niche segment of consumers that are less concerned about the
security of their data. The disruptive strategy would very likely be
unsuccessful inside H&R Block, where the main value proposition
throughout the firm's history has been individualized service, which
comes with high marginal profits.155 Additionally, the barriers to entry
for startups would probably be relatively high in the short runpreventing TaxACT copycats from filling its role-because consumers
likely value using the same service year after year when the service
remembers past data entries. Therefore, this merger would likely be
illegal under the disruptive innovation version of the maverick-firm
theory of anticompetitive harm.
In the mobile telecommunications industry, T-Mobile is also
likely a disruptive innovator. Its offering is of lower quality than the
offerings of its competitors because its coverage is less comprehensive
and it does not have a history of securing relationships with the
newest handheld devices.1 56 It trades off these disadvantages for lower
price: its strategy prior to the proposed merger was to present a
smartphone and data-package offer to those customers who could not
afford to purchase one from Verizon or AT&T.15 7 Given Verizon's and
AT&T's race to secure more spectrum and superior coverage, 58 it is
154. See Clayton Christensen, Disruptive Innovation, TEDXBOSTON (July 18, 2011),
http://tedxboston.org/adventure/clayton-christensen-disruptive-innovation (describing TurboTax
as a disruptive innovation).
155. H&R Block PI Memo, supra note 87, at 8 (indicating H&R Block's concern that digital
solutions would jeopardize brick-and-mortar stores).
156. See, e.g., Christina Bonnington, T-Mobile Announces LTE, Blames iPhone for
Subscriber Losses, WIRED.COM (Feb. 23, 2012, 3:53 PM), http//www.wired.com/gadgetlab
/2012/02/t-mobile-1te-initiative/ (discussing T-Mobile's inferior performance as being the product
of not securing a contract with Apple to carry the iPhone and not offering the superior 4G LTE
network to improve data coverage); see also AT&T Coverage Viewer, AT&T,
http://www.wireless.att.com/coverageviewer/#?type-voice (last visited Sept. 18, 2012); Cell Phone
Coverage Maps for Your Calling Coverage Areas, T-MOBILE, http://www.t-mobile.com/coverage
/pcc.aspx (last visited Sept. 18, 2012); Coverage Locator, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://www.
verizonwireless.conilb2c/support/coverage-locator (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
157. See Amended Complaint, United States v. AT&T Inc., supra note 57, f 32-33
(referring to T-Mobile's plans to make smartphones available to more users by offering prices
that AT&T and Verizon cannot match).
158. See, e.g., Scott Mortiz & Todd Shields, AT&T in Spectrum Spree to Catch Verizon,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 5, 2012, http://www.businessweek.comlnews/2012-08-30/atand-t-amassing-spectrum-deals-in-catch-up-bid-with-verizon (detailing the race for superior
coverage between AT&T and Verizon).
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unlikely that this tradeoff is acceptable to more than a niche segment
of the population. In fact, T-Mobile's own strategy prior to the
proposed merger was to supply this niche segment of the population
with a smartphone that they otherwise would not be able to afford.15 9
This focus likely indicates that AT&T would have been intolerant of
the disruptive strategy once it had acquired T-Mobile. Furthermore,
the barriers to entry are quite high for potential copycats: the
telecommunications space is highly regulated and bandwidth
limitations could prevent startups from entering quickly (or at all).160
Therefore, the proposed merger would also likely be illegal under the
disruptive innovation version of the maverick-firm theory of
anticompetitive harm.
CONCLUSION
The maverick-firm theory of anticompetitive harm needs an
overhaul, and this Note suggests a set of criteria that make the
maverick label more than just "a game of semantic gotcha." This
solution comes at a ripe time, given the government's recent reliance
on the maverick label in challenging the H&R Block/TaxACT and
AT&T/T-Mobile mergers. Although the DOJ probably would have
reached a similar conclusion about these proposed mergers if it
applied the solution proposed in this Note, its application of the
maverick-firm theory was unnecessarily confusing and failed to meet a
basic requirement of antitrust law: showing that postmerger
anticompetitive harm is likely.
The disruptive innovation test answers the challenge posed by
the H&R Block court, which admonished the government for failing to
set out "a clear standard, based on functional or economic
considerations to distinguish a maverick from any other aggressive
competitor." 16 1 If the government adopts the business-management
theory of disruptive innovation as its definition of a maverick, it will
be able to show that the target firm is unique in its ability to constrain
competitors and that it must remain independent to do so. The theory
motivating this test likely already drove some of the logic behind the
159. See Amended Complaint, United States v. AT&T Inc., supra note 57,
32 ("A key
component of T-Mobile's new strategy is to offer 'Disruptive Pricing' plans to attract the
estimated 150 million consumers whom T-Mobile believes will want a smartphone but do not
have one yet.').
160. See id
36 (referencing the high barriers to entry in the mobile wireless
telecommunications services markets).
161. United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 79 (D.D.C. 2011).
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2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and recent enforcement actions,
but this more specific test will be more persuasive to courts and will
allow practitioners to more accurately assess the antitrust
implications of acquiring a low-cost firm.
Taylor M. Owings*
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